Unenumerated Duties by West, Robin
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Robin West
Do legislators have a moral, political, or legal duty-a binding,
positive obligation, whatever its source-to pass laws that will protect
citizens against the ill effects of private violence, acts of warfare, natu-
ral disaster, or man-made environmental calamity? Do they have a
moral or political obligation to provide for the poorest citizens who
would otherwise go without shelter, clothing, and nutritious food?
Do legislators have an obligation of any sort to use their law-making
power in such a way as to ensure for all citizens a decent livelihood,
adequate wages, security in retirement, safe passage to high ground
in the event of a hurricane, a good education, health care, or a
healthy environment? More generally, do they have a positive obliga-
tion-again, no matter its source-to pass laws toward the end of fur-
thering the public interest, or the community's well-being, rather
than their own? Must legislators act in such a way so as to promote
the greatest happiness of the greatest number? Do they have a duty
to do so?
I do not intend to answer any of these questions. All I want to do
is highlight, and I hope make problematic, the relative absence of
questions about the affirmative duties of legislators-not negative du-
ties to restrain from acting (such as a duty not to infringe upon
speech) or negative duties to restrain from acting in particular ways
(such as a duty not to legislate in discriminatory ways), but positive,
affirmative duties to pass laws so as to achieve various welfarist ends-
from our jurisprudential and constitutional dialogue about law in lib-
eral, constitutional democracies. That absence, I suggest, is not his-
torically inexplicable, but it is more than just a little odd. There is,
after all, no shortage of discussion about these and related questions
in the liberal theory that is the claimed philosophical bedrock of our
constitutional jurisprudence. Thomas Hobbes argued that the sover-
eign has a political and natural law-based duty to protect citizens of
the commonwealth against both private violence and acts of war, a
breach of which justifies revolution.1 Although he famously derided
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the notion that any law passed by the sovereign of a commonwealth
could be unjust,2 what is often overlooked is that he also spelled out,
in some detail, the positive moral duty of the commonwealth's repre-
sentative sovereign to pass laws that are good, necessary, and perspica-
cious-providing both examples and definitions of each require-
ment. John Locke did not depart from Hobbes on this point and
indeed stated clearly that the legislature has a duty to enact laws that
are in the public good and to do so in a way that treats rich and poor
similarly.4 Jeremy Bentham and his fellow utilitarian radicals argued
that legislators are morally bound to use their power in such a way as
to provide for the greatest happiness of the greatest number, rather
than for the greatest happiness of elites." John Stuart Mill argued for
a strong duty, also grounded in utilitarian ethics, on the part of law-
makers to ameliorate poverty and to provide, to the extent they can
do so, the necessary basis for a good life for all.
On this side of the Atlantic, liberal philosophers friendly to
American constitutionalism and to our rights traditions have also
recognized and insisted upon a legislative or sovereign duty to pass
laws that protect various vulnerabilities. Thomas Paine argued to-
ward the end of his life that, at least in constitutional democracies
such as the United States, the state, through law, must provide what
we would today call welfare rights to the neediest citizens! Without
such a legislative duty, Paine thought, the Lockean social contract at
the heart of American constitutionalism, with its aggressive protec-
tions of individual rights of property, mijht well benefit some, but it
would leave many worse off than before. Therefore, Paine argued,
without a duty to ameliorate the poverty and misery that the social
compact causes, the constitutional pact is unconscionable, hence un-
enforceable. A quarter century ago, John Rawls famously argued for
the existence of a loosely contractual and neo-Kantian duty on the
part of the state to address wealth inequalities wherever those ine-
qualities seriously undercut the position of the least well-off-all
within the context of a liberal and constitutional theoretical state,
2 Id. at *182.
sId. at *181-82.
JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT, para. 142 (1690), reprinted in THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL
403, 461 (Edwin A. Burtt ed., 1939) [hereinafter ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS].
5 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 11-
13 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1789).
6 JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM, ch. 2 (1863), reprinted in ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS,
supra note 4, at 895, 899-916.
THOMAS PAINE, AGRARIAN JUSTICE (1797), reprinted in 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE,
1791-1804, at 322 (Moncure Daniel Conway ed., 1894).
8 Id. at 329.
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rigorously respectful of individual rights.9 Ronald Dworkin has ar-
gued at various times over the last thirty years that a liberal state that
respects all equally must attend to the inequalities that are a function,
not of choice, but of unchosen disparities of inherited wealth or tal-
ent." And today Martha Nussbaum, perhaps our most important con-
temporary liberal philosopher, has begun to advance the neo-
Aristotelian case that sovereigns in liberal, constitutional states have a
duty to protect and nurture the basic human capabilities of all citi-
zens so that they might have decent lives." All of these proponents of
liberalism believed, or believe, that legislators in liberal states have
positive duties to act-to legislate-and to do so toward particular
ends. All of them viewed (or view) those affirmative duties of the leg-
islative sovereign to pass laws so as to protect citizens against various
risks as central, not peripheral, to the liberal project.
What do we find in liberal constitutional theory? Nothing even
remotely comparable. It is as though, by some unspoken consensus,
constitutional lawyers, unlike political and moral liberal theorists,
have tacitly agreed that American constitutionalism somewhere along
the line simply turned its back on this bedrock tenet of both classical
and modern liberal theory. There is almost nothing in liberal consti-
tutional theory about the possible constitutional grounding of the
moral duties, whether enumerated or unenumerated, of either fed-
eral or state legislators to legislate, or to do so in particular ways, or
toward particular ends.
That statement requires some qualification and clarification, but
not much. First, of course, we do find in both case law and constitu-
tional scholarship volumes of liberal arguments to the effect that leg-
islators have some measure of legitimacy when they do act so as to
protect certain values or further some of these goals. Indeed, the dis-
tilled liberal-constitutional wisdom of the last century might be
summed up as tracking just this conclusion: legislators do not tram-
ple on the rights of individuals or violate their own negatively defined
duties of restraint when they legislate so as to bring about a clean en-
vironment,12 a minimum wage," a progressive income tax,14 some
0 JOHN RAWLS, ATHEORYOFJUSTICE 100-08 (1971).
IS These essays are collected in RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND
PRACIiCE OF EQUALITY (2000).1 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH
4-14, 70-105 (2000).
12 The power of Congress to pass laws under the Commerce Clause that further public
health has been established since the repudiation of Lochner, signaled by cases such as United
States v. Carotene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (upholding the constitutionality of a federal
prohibition on the interstate shipment of skimmed milk mixed with non-milk fats) and William-
son v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (holding constitutional a law forbidding
any person other than a licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist from fitting lenses). See gener-
ally Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
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measure of social security, welfare entitlements for the poor, or safer
streets and homes 5--or at least so liberals think. Likewise, we can
find plenty of speculative scholarship to the effect that, were they to
act in some way that they, to date, have not, they would not be tram-
pling on rights, or violating their own negative duties not to act. Were
Congress to legislate in such a way as to require or provide funding
for a decent public education,'6 or for decent, safe, well-paid jobs for
all adults who want them, or for health care, or childcare, for all citi-
zens who need it, and so on-legislators would be well within their
legitimate authority. But that is a far cry from discussing a possible
duty to do so.
Second, there is a robust, albeit dissenting, body of scholarship in
constitutional dialogue about the possible existence of some unenu-
merated, positive, constitutional rights that might sensibly be re-
garded as the corollary of some of the possible legislative duties I
have listed above, or at least the subclass of those unenumerated
rights that might arguably have some sort of historical or preceden-
tial, if not textual, basis in the United States Constitution. A respect-
able canon of scholarly work continues to argue for the existence of
constitutionally protected affirmative welfare or social rights, Su-
preme Court recalcitrance notwithstanding. 7 There is, or was, some
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972) (demonstrating
that the Court's economic equal protection doctrine reinforces its deferential economic due
process model); Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation
and Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 34 (speculating on reasons for the Court's extreme deference
to Congress in areas of economic due process).
13 See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding the constitutional-
ity of a state minimum wage law for women).
14 The Supreme Court struck down a federal income tax on interest earned on state bonds
as a violation of Article I, Section 9, of the Constitution in Pollock v. Farmers'Loan & Trust Co.,
158 U.S. 601 (1895) (5-4 decision), but overruled Pollock in South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505
(1988).
15 But see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking a provision of the Civil
Rights Remedies for Gender-Motivated Violence Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40302, 108 Star.
1902, 1941-42 (1994), as beyond commerce powers); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104
Stat. 4789, 4844-45, which made it a federal offense for any individual to knowingly possess a
firearm in a school zone), superseded by statute, Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 320904, 108 Stat. 1796, 2125-26.16 The Court has famously held that there is no right to an education, and hence no right to
an equitably funded education on equal protection grounds. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). But see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that illegal
immigrants may not be denied access to public schools on grounds of alienage). However, the
constitutionality of both state and federal power to legislate over education, such as in the re-
cent federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002),
which imposes performance-based standards and conditions for funding, appears to be beyond
question.
17 See, e.g., Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the
Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 3 (1987) (arguing for "a societal obligation to assure survival"); Peter
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literature regarding the duty of legislators to act so as to guarantee
access to whatever one might have an unenumerated negative right
to, such as abortion or contraception,"' although that seems to have
slowed in the face of considerable Supreme Court authority to the
contrary. 9 Likewise, there is sporadic writing on possible "affirma-
tive" interpretations, and corresponding required legislative actions
of well recognized negative rights such as the freedoms of speech, the
press, or assembly. ° And there are a small number of section 1983
cases and a somewhat larger body of commentary arguing that, not-
withstanding Supreme Court dicta to the contrary, we do have a con-
stitutional right to police protection against private violence, at least
in some circumstances.2 ' All of this, however, is most decidedly rights
focused, rather than duty focused, and more importantly all of this is
very much at the margins of the constitutional law canon. None of it
is recognized by the current Supreme Court or by any Supreme
Court of the century just concluded.
Finally, there are a few clear counterexamples: constitutional
theorists that do directly address the moral duties legislators might
have to use law in such a way as to achieve various welfarist ends.
Ronald Dworkin, as noted above, has painstakingly argued in a series
Edelman, Welfare and the Politics of Race: Same Tune, New Lyrics?, 11 CEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL'Y 389, 403 (2004) (arguing that "economic justice [is] a race issue"); Frank I. Michelman,
In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls'Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV.
962, 966 (1973) (discussing the "inclusion of specific welfare guaranties in a constitution");
Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7, 9 (1969) (arguing that the "equality explosion of" the
Warren Court's jurisprudence "ha[d] largely been ignited by a reawakened sensitiv-
ity ... to... minimum welfare" (internal quotations omitted)). The welfarist conception is
heavily indebted to John Rawls' early work, particularly A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at
100-02. See generally William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 8
(1999) (comparing the arguments of Michelman and Owen Fiss with that of Rawls); William E.
Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
1821, 1873-77 (2001) (critiquing Michelman's reading of Rawls).
8 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Morris, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: From U.S. "Rights Talk" to
Western European "Responsibility Talk," 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 761, 764-65 (1993) (arguing that
the community should take responsibility for imposing its values by paying for a woman's choice
to not have an abortion).
19 See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980) (holding that the Hyde Amendment,
Pub. L. No. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat. 1460, 1460 (1977), which restricts the funding of abortions to
those necessary to save the life of the mother, does not violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479 (1977) (holding that the Constitu-
tion is not violated when an abortion is not paid by Medicaid).
See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, Speech in the Welfare State: A New Deal for Speech, in THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION 197, 197-231 (1993) (arguing that First Amendment rights must be enforced
through positive action by legislators as well as by legislative restraint).
21 See, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, Note, Battered Women's Substantive Due Process Claims: Can
Orders of Protection Deflect DeShaney?, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1280, 1281 & n.7, 1284-87, 1320-23
(1990) (noting some precedent for battered women's section 1983 claims against a state that
fails to enforce protective orders).
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of articles over the last thirty years that liberal states must attend to
material inequalities that are a function not of choice but of morally
irrelevant aspects of personhood such as inherited wealth or talent. 2
Likewise, Martha Nussbaum has argued on Aristotelian grounds for a
state obligation to promote the capabilities of all citizens to achieve
some conception of the good life as defined by their own lights. 3
Both Nussbaum and Dworkin are constitutional theorists as well as
liberal political philosophers, and both are clear that their subject
matter is the obligation of legislators (or states) to attend to inequal-
ity in constitutional, liberal democracies. But in both cases the liberal
arguments put forward for state involvement are disconnected from
the theorist's constitutional jurisprudence. Thus, for Nussbaum, the
argument that constitutional liberal states have an obligation to pro-
tect basic capabilities is described not as a constitutional imperative
or as having any connection at all to constitutionalism but rather as a
good idea that constitutional governments could and should em-
brace.24 Dworkin's constitutional jurisprudence is far thicker and
vastly more complex than Nussbaum's, but the detachment of his
moral views on the duties of the state to the poor from his constitu-
tionalism is strikingly similar: although equality is the sovereign vir-
tue and demanded of states and legislators, its implementation,
Dworkin makes clear, is delineated by our Constitution "as a matter
of 'policy,' not 'principle.'-2 5 The Constitution, even for Dworkin,
plays a negligible role in his understanding of the demands of equal
respect, and no role at all-indeed a negative role-in his under-
standing of how his conception of equal respect is to be realized.
Larry Sager has recently argued that our constitutional practices
must aim for justice (rather than, for example, fidelity to the original
understanding) ;26 that justice requires, among other things, that citi-
zens have the right to a decent standard of living in exchange for
hard work;27 that for various reasons courts cannot enforce such a
right; and that legislators, viewed as partners with the courts in the
pursuit of justice through constitutionalism, must have the primary
DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 11-119.
25 NUSSBAUM, supra note 11, at 76-81.
24 Id. at 102-05.
25 DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 179.
26 LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
PRACrICE 30-42, 70-84 (2004) [hereinafter SAGERJUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES]. Sager's book is a
combination of portions of previously published articles. Lawrence Sager, The Betrayal ofJudg-
ment, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1545 (1997); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212 (1978) [hereinafter Sager, Fair Meas-
ure]; Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88
Nw. U. L. REV. 410 (1993).
27 SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES, supra note 26, at 95-105.
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responsibility for acting in such a way as to protect this right.
28
Sager's work is surely the closest to a full defense of the position that
is most striking, in my view, for its general absence from mainstream
constitutional theory. Yet even in Justice in Plainclothes, his most re-
cent and thorough account of legislative obligations to support as-
pects of the underenforced Constitution, there are some striking la-
cunae. First, Sager's argument is phrased almost entirely in terms of
individual rights, rather than duties, and legislatures enter the pic-
ture as the institution that will be on occasion best suited to protect
those rights. Perhaps because of that, legislatures, although pro-
moted to the position of "partner" in his justice-seeking constitutional
scheme, are partners of a junior sort. Legislatures must act to protect
these rights when courts, for prudential reasons, cannot. Second, the
basis of the moral right to a decent standard of living held by hard-
working people is left unclear: individuals have the right because jus-
tice requires it, but there is no suggestion as to why this is so and no
clear argument as to why the Constitution requires it as well. Third,
and to my mind most tellingly, the reason the legislator rather than
the judge enters the picture at all has to do with the prudential im-
pediments to adjudication rather than the existence of moral and
constitutional duties. Like the majority of scholars, Sager believes the
Constitution is about rights and their judicial enforcement-except
when that is impractical, at which point the legislature must fill the
gap. Sager does clearly argue that if we regard the Constitution as a
vehicle for justice, as we should, it must be understood as requiring
enforcement by legislators as well as courts.2 9 The question is why, in
our constitutional culture, that is such an extraordinary claim rather
than a given.
We can sum it up this way: What we find when we look at the con-
stitutional scholarship regarding legislative duty is something like the
proverbial skin of an onion. First, we find volumes on judicially en-
forced, enumerated negative rights with their implied duties of re-
straint upon legislators. If I have a right to something, the legislature
has a duty not to pass laws that forbid it. Second, we find, perhaps
not volumes, but a sizeable body of case law and scholarship con-
structing unenumerated negative rights of individuals from the pe-
numbras of enumerated ones-with, again, correlative obligations of
restraint for legislators. Thus, whatever I have an unenumerated,
penumbral negative right to enjoy without interference from law-
life, guns, abortions, contraception-legislators have a duty to refrain
from forbidding. Peel off that layer, and we find a much smaller but
still substantial body of scholarship constructing unenumerated posi-
28S Id. at 102-28.
29 Id.
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tive rights, often from the penumbra of unenumerated negative ones.
After all, if I, the unborn child, have a negative right to life, perhaps I
have a positive right to whatever it takes to sustain it-a right, per-
haps, to prenatal care, piggybacked on my right to be free of abor-
tion; if I, the woman, have a negative right to an abortion, perhaps I
have a positive right to the financial resources necessary to obtain
one; and, more broadly, if I, the citizen, have a republican right to
participate in government, perhaps I have positive rights to whatever
support is necessary to make that participation meaningful. ° After
peeling off the final layer, we find occasional mentions of legislative
duties to act, implied on the back of unenumerated, underenforced,
and perhaps judicially unenforceable positive rights.3 But those
mentions are few and far between, and even those occasional men-
tions are typically made within the context of an argument whose
main point is to take the judiciary off the hook of constitutional or
moral responsibility rather than put the legislature on it.
Now for what we do not find: We find nothing, even within this
dissenting constitutional literature regarding unenumerated positive
rights, that painstakingly develops the contours of the moral, civic,
political, or constitutional obligations of legislators, operating within
a constitutional form of government, to provide for any of what citi-
zens are arguably entitled, by right, to enjoy. 2 Most strikingly, we
find nothing about the obligations of legislators, within a constitu-
tional democracy, to legislate where there is both no plausible argu-
ment for a correlate judicially enforceable right and no real argu-
30 This is the analytic structure of many critical arguments attempting to problematize the
distinction between public and private, action and inaction, state and individual. For a good
summary and comment on this argument, see Gary Peller & Mark Tushnet, State Action and a
New Birth of Freedom, 92 GEO. L.J. 779 (2004), which maintains that Professor Charles Black's
assertion of the existence of welfare rights rests on his earlier repudiation of state action doc-
trine, which rested on a challenge to the distinction between the state and private realms of life.
31 See, e.g., SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES, supra note 26, at 84-128 (framing affirmative
rights in terms of a theory of constitutional underenforcement); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND
BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 61-95
(2004) (distinguishing "constitutional rights" from President Roosevelt's innovative interpreta-
tion of "constitutive commitments"); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM
THE COURTS 6-32 (1999) (discussing the constitutional roles and duties of the various branches
of government); ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 9-44 (1994) (arguing that the abolitionists understood the language
of the Fourteenth Amendment to require government protection from private violence); Sager,
Fair Measure, supra note 26 (arguing that legislatures ought to enforce constitutional norms un-
derenforced by the federal judiciary); Robin West, Katrina, The Constitution, and the Legal Ques-
tion Doctrine, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 101-03, on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law) (arguing that public officials have a duty
to reduce poverty and that they failed to do so in New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane
Katrina).
32 Perhaps the closest is SUNSTEIN, supra note 31, at 182-83, which outlines the rights that a
second bill of rights" might encompass.
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ment that the legislator lacks legitimate authority. We find no discus-
sion, that is, of these questions: Within the sphere of a legislator's
conceded authority, or power, to make law in a constitutional gov-
ernment, or in our constitutional government, what is the scope of
the conscientious legislator's duty to do so? How should he use his
legitimate power? Does the Constitution, or constitutionalism, or
constitutional republicanism, or, most broadly, the animating idea of
constitutional governance, have nothing to say about this at all? If
not, why not? And if so, why don't we ever talk about it? In fact, why
isn't this question at the very core of our understanding of constitu-
tionalism? Why do we "constitute" a government in the first place?
What is it supposed to do?
Two widely cited possible justifications for this nonpractice come
to mind. The first is based in positive constitutional law, the second,
loosely, in constitutional culture. Both are transparently inadequate.
I will discuss them briefly in the first two Parts below. In my view,
however, the best explanation-not justification-for the absence of
recognition of (or debate about) legislative duties is neither positive
law nor constitutional culture but rather the influence of a widely
shared, and not often articulated, constitutional jurisprudence. In
the third and most important Part below, I will argue that, underlying
our relative inattentiveness to the positive moral obligations of state
actors, and especially legislators, in liberal constitutional societies
such as our own, there is a set of jurisprudential assumptions that
constitutional scholars, perhaps uniquely, hold. Constitutionalists, I
will argue, tend to conflate moral claims and questions with constitu-
tional claims and questions, then to conflate constitutional questions
with legal questions, and finally to conflate legal questions with judi-
cial claims and questions. Precisely because of this threefold confla-
tion the moral question posed above about the possible existence of
positive duties of legislators becomes, reductively, whether or not
courts will recognize or have recognized any constitutional grounds
for such duties. And, the answer to that question, as every law stu-
dent knows, is, resoundingly, no-ergo, no moral duties.
So, in Part III of this essay, I will argue that it is this jurispru-
dence-a jurisprudence that counsels a reduction of moral questions
about good governance to constitutional questions, constitutional
questions to legal questions, and legal questions to judicial ques-
tions-and not either positive law or interpretive culture that under-
lies the reluctance of constitutional scholars, lawyers, and judges to
recognize or discuss legislative duties. Finally, I will urge that consti-
tutional scholars should abandon this jurisprudence-a set of claims I
have elsewhere referred to as the "legal question doctrine"-lock,
stock, and barrel. There are many reasons for doing so, not the least
of which is that abandoning it would allow us, perhaps even force us,
to confront the question of whether legislators have positive duties to
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pass laws that serve welfarist ends, and if so, of what those duties
might consist.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
First, though, why might we be justified in never raising the ques-
tion? One might be tempted to say that constitutional theorists, law-
yers, and judges never talk about the positive duties of legislators be-
cause, given our particular form of constitutionalism, as a matter of
brute constitutional law understood positivistically, they have none.
Judge Posner put the point this way in a case from the mid-eighties in
which a plaintiff had unsuccessfully asserted the existence of a sub-
stantive-due-process right of citizens to protection against private vio-
lence, and hence, indirectly, the duty of state actors to provide it:
[T] here is no constitutional right to be protected by the state against be-
ing murdered by criminals or madmen. It is monstrous if the state fails
to protect its residents against such predators but it does not violate the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or, we suppose, any
other provision of the Constitution. The Constitution is a charter of
negative liberties; it tells the state to let people alone; it does not require
the federal government or the state to provide services, even so elemen-
tary a service as maintaining law and order.
Chief Justice Rehnquist famously made the same point, albeit in
dicta, in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,
purporting to speak on behalf of the Framers:
[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the
State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against inva-
sion by private actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's
power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and
security.... [Ilts language cannot fairly be extended to impose an af-
firmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not
come to harm through other means. Nor does history support such an
expansive reading of the constitutional text.... Its purpose was to pro-
tect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protected
them from each other. The Framers were content to leave the extent of
governmental obligation in the latter area to the democratic political34
processes.
The argument from positive law, then, would simply be that constitu-
tionalists do not discuss legislators' positive duties to pass laws for wel-
farist ends because they have none. There are no positive rights to
welfare, or safety, or law and order, or anything else government
Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).




might bestow, so there are no correlative legislative duties to provide
them.
However, this widely shared view that the Due Process Clause, the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Constitution generally protect
negative and not positive rights, even if true, clearly does not imply
that legislators have no positive duties to legislate toward welfarist
ends, nor does it account for the lack of scholarly interest in the sub-
ject. First, of course, the historical claim deeply embedded within it
(regarding the original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Framers) might not be true, which is not to say that Judge Posner's
holding in DeVito or Chief Justice Rehnquist's dicta in DeShaney is
wrong but to suggest that the case law does not state the full extent of
the Amendment's meaning well. As a number of historians and con-
stitutional scholars have argued, both the history and text of the
Fourteenth Amendment suggest something much broader than the
Rehnquist-Posner view, even with respect to the Due Process Clause,
and certainly with respect to the Equal Protection Clause.35 After all,
the Fourteenth Amendment textually asserts that no state shall
"deny... protection of the laws."36 Simply removing the double nega-
tive makes it clear that both the states and Congress have a positive
obligation under the Amendment to provide protection of the laws
against unspecified evils. What evils? Among the minimal list of evils
the states are positively required to protect citizens from, the Framers
almost certainly intended to include the evil of private violence.3 7 Not
only is this duty made clear by the English common law understand-
ing of the sovereign's duty to provide "protection of the laws," from
which the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment language drew, 8 but it is
also evidenced by the noncontroversial history of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: it was, after all, the wave
of unregulated lynchings of freed slaves following passage of the
Thirteenth Amendment that in part prompted passage of the Four-
teenth. 9 Indeed, protection of the laws against private violence, con-
tra the Rehnquist-Posner position recited above, might be fairly re-
garded as the one unequivocal aim of the Fourteenth Amendment in
35 See, e.g., JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 201-39 (Collier Books 1965) (1951)
(originally published as THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT) (arguing
that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to assure the constitutionality, in part, of the
Freedmen's Bureau and civil rights bills, themselves aimed at securing the rights of freed slaves
against private violence and other deprivations of natural and civil rights).
:6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4 (emphasis added).
7 TENBROEK, supra note 35, at 203-04.
38 See Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 513 (1991) ("[T]he king's duty of protection included the obliga-
tion to protect his subjects from violence.").
39 TENBROEK, supra note 35, at 202.
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its entirety, and certainly of the Equal Protection Clause more spe-
cifically. The DeShaney dicta, whatever else might be said of it, is radi-
cally ahistorical.
I have made this argument elsewhere 4 and will not repeat it in any
detail here beyond the sketch suggested above. I do want to empha-
size, though, that many others have understood the historical mean-
ing of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
likewise, including, notably, Richard Posner. In fact, he has insisted
on it. In his piece from the early 1990s, Bork and Beethoven, Posner
takes Robert Bork's intentionalism to task, providing as an example
of the perils of intentionalist interpretation of the Constitution the
difference, as he understands it, between the meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause as propounded by courts and the Supreme Court
and the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause to its drafters.4'
What the drafters intended by the Clause, Posner argues, was that
thereafter the states would be required to protect everyone, and
equally, against private violence, including Klan violence. Conse-
quently, Posner goes on, under a truly intentionalist account of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Brown v. Board of Education4 3 (and much
else) is clearly wrong: a guarantee that states will provide protection
against private violence, intended by the Amendment, has nothing to
do with school segregation. Therefore, Posner concludes, since
44Brown is clearly right, intentionalism must be wrong. For purposes
of his dispute with Bork over intentionalism, Posner simply asserts as
fact that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended by that
Amendment to impose a duty upon legislators to protect against pri-
vate violence-exactly the duty he denies exists in Bowers v. DeVito,
quoted above.
This is more than simply an inadvertent contradiction by a prolific
scholar andjudge. Rather, it points to an important limitation on the
meaning of the DeShaney dicta and the DeVito holding regarding the
nonexistence of legislative duties. It is now an unassailable point of
constitutional law, as elucidated by the Supreme Court and countless
lower courts, that neither the Due Process Clause nor the Equal Pro-
tection Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment in its entirety impose
affirmative obligations on legislators. DeShaney and DeVito are built on
a solid body of adjudicative constitutional law, as interpreted by
courts: the courts have indeed consistently read the Fourteenth
Amendment (both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process
40 See WEST, supra note 31, at 1-44.
41 Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1365, 1374-76 (1990).
42 Id.
3 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
Posner, supra note 41, at 1376.
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Clause) as containing no positive rights or correlative duties.45 But it
does not follow, as Posner's historical claim in Bork and Beethoven
makes clear, that the DeShaney interpretation is what the Constitu-
tion's Framers intended, nor is it true that that is the only interpreta-
tion the text can sustain. That the Constitution imposes no judicially
enforceable duties upon legislators, in other words, is a true state-
ment of our adjudicated constitutional law. But it is not a true state-
ment-it is demonstrably false-regarding the meaning of the consti-
tutional text's language, and it does not accurately reflect the
intended meaning of those who historically brought the Amendment
into being. It may well be that as a matter of constitutional law there
are no legally enforceable affirmative duties incumbent upon legislators
to protect citizens against violence (or to do anything else). It cer-
tainly does not follow that the Constitution, as opposed to constitu-
tional law, imposes no such duties.
The significance, and breadth, of the DeVito-DeShaney claim is lim-
ited in two further respects as well: First, even if it is true, as
Rehnquist and Posner claim, that as a matter of positive law the Four-
teenth Amendment imposes no duties upon legislators, nothing fol-
lows regarding the extent of a legislator's moral duties to legislate in
certain ways and toward certain ends when it is clearly within their
power to do so. Surely, as a matter of simple brute logic, even if there
is no constitutional duty incumbent upon legislators to act in a cer-
tain way, so long as there is constitutional power to do so there may
nevertheless be a moral duty. Ought famously implies can-as in, has
the power-it does not imply legal compulsion. In other words, even
if it is true that the Constitution is merely a charter of negative liber-
ties and tells the states only when they must, constitutionally, back off
and let people alone-and never tells them when they must, constitu-
tionally, intervene-it does not follow that legislators have no moral
obligations to criminalize violence or protect against disaster, home-
lessness, unemployment, and so on. The colorful Posnerian claim,
shared not only by the current Court but by the Court institutionally
throughout the last century, that while it might be "monstrous" it is
not unconstitutional for states to refuse to criminalize violence (or en-
force the laws against it) 46 gets us nowhere toward understanding why
constitutional scholars, lawyers, and judges do not perceive it as
within their purview to ask why, in a constitutional form of govern-
ment, it might indeed be "monstrous"-morally monstrous-for the
state to fail to provide protection against violent criminals. Lack of
45 This was most recently affirmed in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005)
(holding that a person is not entitled to police enforcement of a domestic abuse restraining
order).
46 Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
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curiosity on that score has consequences: if we fail to ask why it
might be "monstrous" to fail in this regard, we then fail to ask what
other failures might be equally monstrous, or what that monstrosity
might tell us about legislative duties in a constitutional democracy.
Nor does it follow from the DeVito-DeShaney holding that our con-
stitutional form of government does not itself contemplate the exis-
tence of such moral obligations. There may be, as a growing body of
constitutional scholarship now suggests, constitutional obligations or
(whether or not this is the same thing) moral obligations implied by
our constitutional form of government that are fully realizable and
either delineated in or suggested by the text but that are simply not
grist for the litigation mill. In other words, we may have a political
as well as legal Constitution that deserves expounding and has not to
date gotten any. If so, even assuming that DeShaney correctly spells
out what sorts of obligations courts will enforce against recalcitrant
legislators as a matter of law, it does not follow that the dicta is cor-
rect as a matter of constitutional politics: there may be constitutional
obligations, aspirations, ideals, rights, and responsibilities that are not
recognizable by courts as law but are nevertheless a part of our consti-
tutional scheme of governance. The lack of constitutional duties, or
rights, in our constitutional law does not imply the absolute lack of
such duties or rights; to suggest it does simply begs the question
about the extent of the Constitution's reach into our political and
moral lives. Of course, the suggestion that there might exist such a
political or popular Constitution, with its own nonadjudicable rights
and responsibilites, does not prove its existence or anything at all
about its content: if there is a political constitutional obligation in-
cumbent upon legislators to act in certain ways, that is presumably
demonstrable by some sort of constitutional interpretive argument.
My point here is only the negative one: the nonexistence of such po-
litical duties, constitutionally grounded, does not follow from the
Court's determination that no such right exists as a matter of consti-
47 See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 58 (2004) (discussing the popular view that the Constitution imposed obliga-
tions on the different branches of government); SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES, supra note
26, at 106-08 (discussing the Thirteenth Amendment duty "to move in the direction of com-
pleting the constitutional repair" called for by years of violation); TUSHNET, supra note 31, at
11-14 (discussing the obligations of national identity under the "thin Constitution"); Larry D.
Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 16-74
(2001) (arguing that the Constitution used to be understood as popular law made by the peo-
ple); Reva Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The
Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 2, on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law) (arguing that the Equal Rights Amend-
ment, though defeated, created a new understanding of the duties of legislators and courts to
protect women from discrimination).
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tutional law. Constitutional law, simply put, might not exhaust the
reach of the Constitution.
To sum this up, nothing much follows regarding the extent of leg-
islator's moral duties to legislate within a constitutional, liberal cul-
ture from the observation that individuals do not have legally en-
forceable, justiciable rights to laws prohibiting violence (or laws
providing public education, social security, or clean air and water,
etc.) or that legislators do not have enforceable, justiciable duties to
pass them. Nothing follows, as Posner quite explicitly argued in the
early nineties, regarding either the intent of the Framers or the
meaning of the text, at least regarding the original meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause. 4s Nothing follows regarding legislators' pos-
sible moral obligations within a constitutional democracy in those ar-
eas in which they inarguably possess constitutional authority, even if
there is no constitutional duty. But likewise, perhaps most impor-
tantly, nothing follows regarding what we might call the political con-
stitution's position on these questions. My conclusion that the Con-
stitution imposes no judicially enforceable legal duties on legislators
does not imply that it imposes no political, constitutional, or moral
duties on legislators that might be interpreted by representative bod-
ies and enforced by the people through the ballot box.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE
There is a second and decidedly more promising possible justifica-
tion for the neglect of these questions. One might argue that we do
not talk about legislative duties because we do not, in our rights- and
individualism-drenched constitutional culture, think, behave, or
morally reason in terms of duties, of any sort, ever, period. We are
just not, constitutionally speaking, a duty-based society. Rather, in
this culture, unlike others, we think, behave, and morally reason in
terms of rights, and the difference is deep and fundamental. Ronald
Dworkin insisted on this point early on in the development of his ju-
risprudence, as suggested by this passage from Taking Rights Seriously:
In a well-formed [political] theory some consistent set of [goals, rights,
and duties], internally ranked or weighted, will be taken as fundamental
or ultimate within the theory. It seems reasonable to suppose that any
particular theory will give ultimate pride of place to just one of these
concepts; it will take some overriding goal, or some set of fundamental
rights, or some set of transcendent duties, as fundamental, and show
other goals, rights, and duties as subordinate and derivative.
.... Such a theory might be goal-based, in which case it would take
some goal, like improving the general welfare, as fundamental; it might
48 Posner, supra note 41, at 1374-76.
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be right-based, taking some right, like the right of all men to the greatest
possible overall liberty, as fundamental; or it might be duty-based, taking
some duty, like the duty to obey God's will as set forth in the Ten Com-
mandments, as fundamental....
Right-based and duty-based theories ... place the individual at the
center, and take his decision or conduct as of fundamental importance.
But the two types put the individual in a different light. Duty-based theo-
ries are concerned with the moral quality of his acts, because they sup-
pose that it is wrong... to fail to meet certain standards of behav-
ior. ... Right based theories are, in contrast, concerned with the
independence rather than the conformity of individual action. They
presuppose and protect the value of individual thought and choice.49
In this passage, Dworkin is referring to the "individual" as citizen and
subject of the law, not the individual as lawmaker. The point, broadly
speaking, is that our Constitution construes the individual citizen as
the locus of value, but it is the rights-bearing individual, not a duty-
bearing individual, at the center of our constitutional culture. Thus,
although it suggests a negative answer, at least this passage and the
surrounding chapter does not directly address the question posed
above: whether legislators, or sovereigns, or state actors (rather than
individual citizens as subjects of law's dictates) might have affirmative
duties to act in such a way as to secure through law certain goals,
whether or not those goals represent fundamental rights of individu-
als.
In only one passage does Dworkin consider the question of
whether or not individuals have rights and legislators corresponding
duties to both the enactment and enforcement of some laws rather
than the negative rights individuals have against certain forms of er-
rant or intrusive legislation. ° In the title chapter of Taking Rights Seri-
ously, Dworkin considers the existence of a "moral right of the major-
ity to have its laws enforced, or the right of society to maintain the
degree of order and security it wishes." Perhaps, Dworkin concedes,
and as I will suggest below, it is an important concession. However,
these rights, Dworkin worries, if extensive, would go a long way to-
ward "annihilat[ing]" the rights of individuals to be free of certainS 52
forms of state action.5 2 In order to save the latter then, Dworkin rea-
sons, the former must be construed very narrowly. The individual
only has a right, he concludes, to have enforced those laws he would
have a right to have passed were they not already on the books.53
49 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 171-72 (1977).






That set might include the laws against criminal assault, but, at least
by implication, it includes very little else. There may of course be
other laws, not required by rights, that are "desirable laws," although
Dworkin does not expand on what he means by the word "desirable"
in that sentence. He then goes on to conclude however (and this is
what is central) that the justification for those laws that might be
good or "desirable" laws, but nevertheless to which the individual is
not by right entitled, lies solely in the fact that they are wanted by
large majorities, not in any individual right.54 The passage is compli-
cated, pivotal, not much commented upon, and worth quoting in
full:
It cannot be true.., that anyone has a right to have all the laws of the na-
tion enforced. He has a right to have enforced only those criminal laws,
for example, that he would have a right to have enacted if they were not
already law. The laws against personal assault may well fall into that class.
If the physically vulnerable members of the community-those who need
police protection against personal violence-were only a small minority,
it would still seem plausible to say that they were entitled to that protec-
tion. But the laws that provide a certain level of quiet in public places, or
that authorize and finance a foreign war, cannot be thought to rest on
individual rights. The timid lady on the streets of Chicago is not entitled
to just the degree of quiet that now obtains, nor is she entitled to have
boys drafted to fight in wars she approves. There are laws-perhaps de-
sirable laws-that provide these advantages for her, but the justification
for these laws, if they can be justified at all, is the common desire of a
large majority, not her personal right. If, therefore, these laws do
abridge someone else's moral right to protest, or his right to personal se-
curity, she cannot urge a competing right to justify the abridgement. She
has no personal right to have such laws passed, and she has no compet-S 55
ing right to have them enforced either.
In the first part of this paragraph, Dworkin raises and then par-
tially answers the questions posed above: What laws do we have a
right to have enacted (or enforced)? And, correlatively, what laws do
legislators have a duty to pass? It is worth noting that, even for
Dworkin, the answer is not the null set. Rather, and as far as I can tell
contra both DeShaney and DeVito, the laws against personal assault "fall
into that class." Thus, even within Ronald Dworkin's famously and
rigorously negative rights-based jurisprudence, individuals do have a
right-a decidedly positive right-to the state's protection against as-
sault, which in turn includes, one would suppose, murder, rape, and
battery. Presumably then, if the state were to decriminalize murder
or rape, the vulnerable lady in the street would indeed have suffered
a violation of her moral (hence, for Dworkin at least, her constitu-
54 Id. at 194-95.
55 Id.
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tional) rights-which suggests that DeVito might well be wrong and
the DeShaney dicta misguided, although neither case had been de-
cided at the time of Dworkin's writing. In this first, affirmative part of
the paragraph, Dworkin has thus implicitly acknowledged the possi-
bility, not only of unenumerated positive rights and correlative legis-
lative duties, but also of a very real conflict between a citizen asserting
-a "positive" right to a law to which the citizen is entitled-perhaps,
say, a right to decent gun control legislation, penumbral to the right
to laws against criminal assault-and a citizen asserting a negative
right-perhaps a Second Amendment right-to be free of such legis-
lation. He does not, however, dwell on the possibility of conflict, or
expand upon the sensitive lady's positive right to physical security
and the state's protection against private assault. As this is the book's
only acknowledgment of the possible existence of such moral and
constitutional rights to laws, rather than rights against the state, the
lack of an explicit discussion about its implications is, in my view, an
unfortunate omission.
More unfortunate is that Dworkin does not say what other laws
might fit into this class-that is, laws to which we may be entitled 6- -
and therefore what other conflicts might be looming between citi-
zens' possible positive rights to have certain laws passed, on the
books, and enforced and citizens' possible negative rights to be free
of the infringement on liberty that all of that might suggest. Again,
this omission is merely unfortunate; Dworkin remains not only the
most prominent but also increasingly the only liberal constitutional
theorist who takes seriously a nexus between moral rights and re-
sponsibilities on the one hand and constitutional law on the other.
Yet he also fails to elaborate on why laws forbidding assault might be
within the category of laws the protection of which we, represented
by the vulnerable little lady on the street, might be entitled. If we
knew the answer to that question, of course, we might know what
other laws might fit in the category, and therefore, in what direction
we could justifiably, or at least sensibly, extend the principle. What is
it about assault, in other words, that gives us this natural right to laws
that protect against it? Is it that unchecked violence subordinates the
weak to the strong? If that is the principle, it would seem to suggest
the mandatory nature of a goodly number of other antisubordina-
tionist legal rules as well, particularly in the economic sphere. Is it,
alternatively, the fear for one's mortality induced by violence? That
might suggest the necessity of laws guaranteeing health care and the
like: welfarist sorts of laws. Is it the intrinsic value of life? That sug-
gests yet another set of laws, possibly required by natural right. Or,
56 He does say what laws do not fall within this class: "foreign wars" and laws prescribing a
requisite degree of peace and quiet. Id. at 195.
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does it have to do with the origin, or longevity, of laws against per-
sonal assault: does their lineage suggest that such laws stem from ra-
tional elaborations of the social contract? If so, what other rational
elaborations might be entailed? Are laws against tortious wrongs also
those to which we are constitutionally entitled? Is it the status of
rights against private assault in the history of natural rights jurispru-
dence? Again, what other such natural rights might we be entitled
to? What about laws protecting against dangerous levels of air and
water pollution? None of this is answered, yet it is at least suggested,
albeit indirectly and minimally.
More important to the larger jurisprudence in this pivotal chapter
of Dworkin's important book is the extremely confusing assertion at
the end of the paragraph. Those laws to which we are not entitled as
a matter of individual right, Dworkin states, might be desirable laws,
but nevertheless, they can be justified by nothing more than that they
are wanted by a majority. That justification, in turn-that the law
represents the majority's desire-is just the sort of thing that can be
readily defeated by a conflicting right (in his example, the sensitive
lady's desire to have foreign wars fought can be defeated by the indi-
vidual's right to be free of an unconstitutional draft, and her desire to
a certain level of peace and order can be defeated by the individual's
right to protest arguably unconstitutional state action). This turns
out to be pivotal to not only this passage but also. Dworkinian juris-
prudence broadly understood. Majoritarian whimsy, and hence ma-
joritarian right, has no standing, so to speak, against a morally signifi-
cant individual claim to moral right. But this looks like an unfair
fight. Even if Dworkin is right about the outcome of a matchup be-
tween mere whimsy, or desire, on the one side, and moral, hence
natural, hence constitutional right on the other, why is he sure that
the its-what-the-majority-wants justification is the best or only justifica-
tion that can be given for those desirable laws-laws that might be
good but to which we are not entitled as a matter of right?
Why is majoritarian whimsy, in other words, the only available
moral 'Justification" this major constitutional theorist of the last cen-
tury can come up with for state law? Why not moral duty or obliga-
tion? Again, let me pose the question with which I began: Is it really
true that there is no duty incumbent upon legislators to pass what
Dworkin calls "desirable laws," beyond the desire of the majority to
have them-a desire which likely presents, contra Dworkin's minimal-
ist suggestion, no moral justification at all? Dworkin gives essentially
no argument for the claim that there is no moral duty on the part of
legislators to legislate in that vast area of regulable social activity
where there is no affirmative right on the part of the individual to
have such laws in the first place-a sphere that might include laws
prohibiting assault but apparently very little else.
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This is, I would suggest, the most significant and confusing non-
argument in the book. It is, first of all, in considerable tension with
the political philosophy Dworkin has so painstakingly argued and de-
fended, a central tenet of which is that a morally virtuous state will go
to considerable lengths to protect against the material inequalities
citizens suffer by virtue of no fault and no choice of their own 7' Like-
wise, it is in considerable tension with a substantial part of the liberal
political theory that Dworkin clearly regards as the philosophical ba-
sis of his jurisprudence. Dworkin may have been right in Taking
Rights Seriously to urge that, in liberal societies, we regard individuals
as endowed primarily with rights and secondarily with duties and that
this heavily determines our understanding of the contours of consti-
tutional law. But it by no means follows that we view states likewise, or
the individual legislators that in part comprise them. Legislators in a
constitutional liberal state may have moral duties to pass laws protect-
ing various interests and securing various goals. Again, Hobbes, Kant,
Hume, Locke, Paine, Bentham, Mill, Rawls, even Nozick, and most
surely Nussbaum-all liberals, some of whom are friends of constitu-
tionalism-all thought so. That we should take individual rights seri-
ously, in other words, does not imply that we should not take legisla-
tive duties seriously as well, or that it is not a part of liberal theory, or
liberal constitutional theory, to do so. Dworkin not only fails to take
constitutionally informed legislative duties seriously, he treats them
with some measure of contempt. It is an uncharacteristically illiberal
gesture.
III. CONSTITUTIONALJURISPRUDENCE
The full explanation, I think, for constitutional scholars' neglect
of questions about legislators' moral duties (as well as our neglect of
other questions regarding the nature of good governance) is that it is
grounded not in positive legal claims about the lack of positive consti-
tutional rights, nor in cultural arguments regarding the status of duty
in an individualist society, but in a jurisprudential world view. More
specifically, our neglect rests on a largely unchallenged set of juris-
57 Dworkin has developed a complex argument to the effect that a just society will and
should strive for material equality, unless inequalities are historically derived from free choices
taken by the individuals themselves (such as a choice for leisure over work). These articles on
equality were originally published in Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Wel-
fare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185 (1981) and Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of
Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981), and have since been collected and republished in
SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, DwoRKIN, supra note 10. In that volume, Dworkin disavows any link be-
tween the virtue he describes and defends and any constitutional argument whatsoever, arguing
to the contrary that "[t]he Constitution... treats social legislation of the form struck down in
Lochneras a matter of policy, not principle." Id. at 179.
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prudential assumptions held, distinctively, by constitutional scholars,
lawyers, and judges-and not shared, or at least not shared in any-
where near the full form, by liberal scholars, even liberal scholars of
the Constitution, from other disciplines. Many conclusions follow from
this jurisprudence, as I will try to describe it, but one of the most im-
portant is that there exists no affirmative constitutional-moral duties
on the part of legislators, only negative duties of restraint. If this is
right, then it gives an answer to the quasi-anthropological question I
posed at the outset. The reason, in short, that constitutional scholars
distinctively show an aversion to even consideration of the possibility
that legislators are under moral, constitutional, or political obliga-
tions to pass certain sorts of welfarist laws is that they share a particu-
lar and defining jurisprudence-one that is not shared by scholars
equally interested in constitutionalism but not trained in law.
The assumptions central to the jurisprudence I am trying to iden-
tify (and that I have elsewhere called the "legal question doctrine")
58
can best be described as consisting of three equivalences. The first
equivalence is strikingly (early) Dworkinian, and radically antipositiv-
ist: to wit, moral and political questions about good governance-
questions such as whether legislators have affirmative duties to act in
particular ways and of what those duties might consist-are in es-
sence, or at least raise, suggest, or correlate with, constitutional ques-
tions. A moral right is, implies, entails, or at least suggests, a constitu-
tional right. Conversely (although it does not follow as a matter of
logic), the lack of a constitutional right, suggests, entails, or implies
the lack of a moral right, or at least, the lack of a moral right of any
constitutional significance. In short, if there is a moral right, there is
a constitutional right; if there is a moral duty, there is a constitutional
duty; if there is no constitutional duty, there is no moral duty. The
Constitution, at heart, defines our political morality.
The second equivalence central to constitutional jurisprudence is
a quasi-empirical claim about the nature of our Constitution. Consti-
tutional questions are understood as being, at their core, legal ques-
tions. It could of course be otherwise: we could have a Constitution
that is aspirational, or political, or moral, or suggestive, but in point
of fact we do not. Nearly all constitutional scholars agree on this
point, including, notably, those who bemoan it, who yearn for it, or
who believe we once had it but have now lost it.5 9 The Constitution is
58 See Robin West, Desperately Seeking a Moralist, 29 HARV.J.L. & GENDER 1, 48 & n. 102 (2006).
59 See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 47, at 73-92 (arguing that popular constitutionalism has long
been a strand of our constitutional theory and practice); SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 347-54
(arguing for a constitution that would aggressively question the status quo as well as new legisla-
tive initiatives); SUNSTEIN, supra note 31, at 209-29 (arguing by comparison with affirmative
rights in other constitutional democracies that the Court could enforce such rights, but that the
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a legal document. It defines our political morality. Butjust as impor-
tant, it is a part of our positive law.
The third equivalence arises from our own particular, thus
unique, constitutional and jurisprudential history. Legal questions
are understood by constitutional lawyers, and maybe all lawyers, as
necessarily raising adjudicative questions-questions for courts to an-
swer. Not only did Chief Justice Marshall sayX something to this effect
in Marbury v. Madison, 4 albeit ambiguously,' but a hundred years of
realist and postrealist jurisprudence have driven the point home:
law, whatever else it is, just must be the province of the judiciary. Law
is what courts turn to when deciding questions-so said John Chip-
man Gray62 -and law is what courts produce when they resolve the is-
sues-so said Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.65 Constitutional lawyers for
the most part (although not Dworkin) concur.
These three equivalencies-that moral questions are constitu-
tional questions, that constitutional questions are in turn legal ques-
tions, and that legal questions, finally, are judicial questions for
courts to decide-are what I am referring to collectively as constitu-
tional jurisprudence. It is by virtue of this jurisprudence that consti-
tutional theorists, I believe distinctively, come to view moral issues
about governance as in a sense equivalent to legal, and hence judi-
cial, questions about enforceable rights and liabilities. The ultimate
consequence of our largely unwitting application of this jurispru-
dence is that for us moral questions about governance are under-
stood as-are even heard as-adjudicative questions of law.
In this context, the upshot of this jurisprudence is that the ques-
tion of whether legislators have moral, constitutional, and political
obligations to pass certain laws is understood by constitutional schol-
ars to ask about legally binding, court-enforceable obligations. The
answer to the question framed in that way is clearly no:64 for many
reasons, at least some of them quite sound, courts are not going to
require recalcitrant lawmakers to legislate toward various ends. By
virtue of our constitutional jurisprudence, this conclusion of law
about the nonexistence of judicially enforceable positive rights be-
better course would be to embrace FDR's stance: affirmative rights are provided in an implicit
and aspirational set of commitments that speak directly to the political branches).
60 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
61 See infra note 89 and surrounding text.
62 SeeJOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAw 93 (Beacon Press 1963)
(1909) ("The Law.... is identical with the rules laid down by the judges, but those rules are laid
down by the judges because they are the law, they are not the Law because they are laid down by
the judges....").
63 See O.W. HOLMESJR., THE COMMON LAw 35-36 (1881) ("Every important principle which
is developed by litigation is in fact and at bottom the result of more or less definitely under-
stood views of public policy.... .").
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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comes a conclusion about the nonexistence of affirmative (rather
than negative) and moral (rather than positive) obligations on the
part of legislators. To mix metaphors, questions about the duties of
legislators as sovereigns to legislate in particular ways are precisely
what gets lost in translation when we "constitutionalize" liberal politi-
cal theory.
Let me expand on this jurisprudence somewhat, step by step, with
a focus on the fate of questions of legislative duty within it. Again, by
"constitutional jurisprudence," I mean to refer not to a particular ar-
gument, but rather to a jurisprudential worldview, or set of intellec-
tual habits, shared by constitutional theorists and consisting of three
definitional equivalencies: moral questions are equated with consti-
tutional questions, constitutional questions are understood to be le-
gal questions, and legal questions are understood to be adjudicative.
I do not know whether any particular theorist has or argues for all
three of these claims explicitly; more likely, some subset of them are
consciously held by overlapping groups of theorists. Nevertheless, I
think that taken together they form a part of our zeitgeist; they are in
the air, and have been for a good while. I want to identify where each
of these claims comes from, how it affects our understanding of the
question regarding duties I posed at the outset, and then ultimately
why we should at least question, and possibly disown, each of the
three legs of this particular jurisprudential stool.
A. The Equivalence of Moral and Constitutional Questions
It is a mainstay of liberal legal thought, still our dominant juris-
prudential perspective within constitutional thinking, that most sig-
nificant moral questions about governance, particularly as regards
rights and duties, have constitutional dimensions or some sort of sub-
stantial overlay or entanglement with constitutional rules and princi-
ples. Ronald Dworkin forcefully defended one version of this argu-
ment-as well as a number of its implications-in his seminal work
both defining and defending the jurisprudential core of liberal legal-
ism, Taking Rights Seriously. Thus, in a typical passage of that work,
Dworkin argued that
[i]n the United States... almost any law which a significant number of
people would be tempted to disobey on moral grounds would be doubt-
ful-if not clearly invalid-on constitutional grounds as well. The consti-
tution makes our conventional political morality relevant to the question
of validity; any statute that appears to compromise that morality raises
constitutional questions, and if the compromise is serious, the constitu-
tional doubts are serious also.
... The Constitution, through the due process clause, the equal pro-
tection clause, the First Amendment, and the other provisions... injects
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an extraordinary amount of our political morality into the issue whether
a law is valid .... [Most draft dissenters] hold beliefs that, if true, strongly
support the view that the law is on their side; the fact that they have not
reached that further conclusion can be traced, in at least most cases, to
65
their lack of legal sophistication.
In another chapter in the same book, his argument produced a simi-
lar effect:
Our constitutional system rests on a particular moral theory, namely, that
men have moral rights against the state. The difficult clauses of the Bill
of Rights, like the due process and equal protection clauses, must be un-
derstood as appealing to moral concepts rather than laying down particu-
lar conceptions ....
... If we give the decisions of principle that the Constitution requires
to the judges, instead of to the people, we act in the spirit of legality, so
far as our institutions permit....
Constitutional law can make no genuine advance until it isolates the
problem of rights against the state and makes that problem part of its
own agenda. That argues for a fusion of constitutional law and moral
theory, a connection that, incredibly, has yet to take place. It is perfectly
understandable that lawyers dread contamination with moral philosophy,
and particularly with those philosophers who talk about rights, because
the spooky overtones of that concept threaten the graveyard of reason.
But better philosophy is now available .... Professor Rawls of Harvard,
for example, has published an abstract and complex book about justice
which no constitutional lawyer will be able to ignore. There is no need
for lawyers to play a passive role in the development of a theory of moral
rights against the state, however .... 66
Yet it is not simply that an "extraordinary amount of political mo-
rality" is injected into constitutional processes. Rather, for Dworkin,
the immoral law, by virtue of the "extraordinary amount of political
morality" to be discovered in the Constitution, just is unconstitu-
tional, or at least very likely so-and hence is not a law. Now, al-
though it might sound like it, this is not your typical natural lawyer's
claim about unjust laws: the Dworkinian argument is not that an "un-
just law is not a law" in some metaphysical sense and solely by virtue
of its injustice. Rather, the argument is that the unjust law is likely
unconstitutional by virtue of its injustice and therefore not a law in a very
positivistic sense indeed. Constitutionalism is in effect the meta-
phorical "bridge" between the worlds of positive (in the sense of posi-
tive law) legal obligation recognized by positive law, and ideal moral
truth, as understood through the lens of "our" political morality.
DWORKIN, supra note 49, at 208, 215.
66 Id. at 147-49 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
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Constitutionalism, at least for Dworkin, is contingently the body of
law that makes our law, in at least a narrow sense, a positivist-natural
blend. Law and morality are one in our liberal legal system (such that
an unjust law is truly not a law, not just in a metaphysical sense, but in
an actual, positivistic sense, meaning the courts will not enforce it
and hence it will not get enforced) not by virtue of any set of meta-
physical claims, but rather by virtue of the general and morally rich
clauses of the United States Constitution. Therefore, at the heart of
Dworkin's early jurisprudence is the claim that at least those obliga-
tions of the state, the states, Congress, and the executive that exist by
virtue of the constitutional rights of individuals are therefore, not
only constitutional obligations, but also moral obligations: if an indi-
vidual has a constitutional claim, it rests on a moral principle. If that
individual claim of right implies a legislative duty, that duty likewise
embodies a moral principle. Constitutional claims are at their root
moral claims-without the moral root, there is no substance to the
constitutional claim.
Does the equivalency work the other way around as well? Clearly,
even if moral principle is a necessary feature of a constitutional claim
(such that all constitutional claims have moral correlates), it does not
necessarily follow that there are not moral duties incumbent upon
legislatures that have no constitutional dimension. That is, all consti-
tutional arguments might well be moral arguments, and it might still
be true that there are some moral arguments [or duties, or rights]
that have no constitutional correlates, or dimensions. Dworkin's con-
stitutional jurisprudence is in fact unclear on this: the essays collec-
tively in Taking Rights Seriously, Law's Empire,67 and A Matter of Princi-
pe66 do not clearly answer the question. From his political
philosophy, particularly on the meaning of equality and the obliga-
tions of liberal states to pursue it, it can fairly be inferred that he
cannot possibly hold such a view: he has argued forcefully that as a
moral matter legislators ought to pass, for example, welfare legisla-
tion (which is, in effect, required as a matter of moral principle) even
though there is, in his view, no constitutional right to such law and
hence no constitutional obligation to do so. 69 But this conclusion-
that legislators have moral obligations completely independent of
constitutional rights of individuals-is at least in tension with the
tight nexus for which he argued, early on, between moral and consti-
tutional right and obligation, his clearly stated desire to see moral de-
liberation about government placed in the hands of judges in the
name of "legality," and his insistence that the moral arguments of
67 RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE (1986).
68 RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985).
69 DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 320-22.
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civil disobedients, for example, almost necessarily have constitutional
correlates. All of these earlier and pointedly constitutional argu-
ments, taken collectively, seemingly implied the straightforward posi-
tion that our "political morality" is not just embedded, but fully em-
bedded in our Constitution-that there is an equivalency, in other
words, and not just a one-way entailment, between constitutional and
moral rule.
Other liberal constitutional theorists made quite explicit the claim
of equivalency that was arguably implicit in Dworkin's constitutional
jurisprudence. Thus, in an important passage in Owen Fiss's influen-
tial and passionate article Objectivity and Interpretation, Fiss argued that
virtually any moral claim a member of our constitutional democracy
might have, can, and should be put in constitutional terms-thus un-
dercutting, so Fiss thought, the critic's claim to an "external perspec-
tive."70 There is, Fiss concluded from this extraordinary conflation,
just no room for an outsider to claim to possess a moral argument
against law that must truly be made from an "outside" perspective.7'
Rather, virtually every serious moral claim can be constitutionalized
and made grist for the civil-rights-litigation mill:
Someone who stands outside of the interpretive community and thus dis-
putes the authority of that community and its rules may provide another
viewpoint. A criticism from this so-called external perspective might pro-
test Plessy on the basis of some religious or ethical principle (e.g., denying
the relevance of any racial distinction) or on the grounds of some theory
of politics (e.g., condemning the decision because it will cause social un-
rest). In that instance, the evaluation is not in terms of the law; it matters
not at all whether the decision is objective. It may be law, even good law,
but it is wrong, whether morally, politically, or from a religious point of
view.
The external critic may accept the pluralism implied by the adjectives
"legal," "moral," "political," and "religious," each denoting different stan-
dards of judgment or different spheres of human activity. The external
critic may be able to order his life in a way that acknowledges the validity
of the legal judgment and that at the same time preserves the integrity of
his view, based on non-legal standards, about the correctness of the deci-
sion. He may render unto the law that which is the law's. Conflict is not
a necessity, but it does occur, as it did over the extension of slavery in the
1850s and over the legalization of abortion in the 1970s. The external
critic will then have to establish priorities. He may move to amend the
Constitution or engage in any number of lesser and more problematic
strategies designed to alter the legal standards, such as packing the court
or enacting statutes that curtail jurisdiction. Failing that, he remains free




to insist that the moral, religious, or political principle take precedence
over the legal. He can disobey.
One of the remarkable features of the American legal system is that it
permits such a broad range of responses to the external critic, and that
over time-maybe in some instances over too much time-the legal sys-
tem responds to this criticism. The law evolves. There is progress in the
law. An equally remarkable feature of the American system is that the
freedom of the external critic to deny the law, and to insist that his
moral, religious, or political views take precedence over the legal inter-
pretation, is a freedom that is not easily exercised. Endogenous change
is always preferred, even in the realm of the wholly intellectual. The ex-
ternal critic struggles to work within the law, say, through amendments,
appointments, or inducing the Supreme Court to recognize that it had
made a mistake. An exercise of the freedom to deny the law, and to insist
that his moral, religious, or political views take precedence, requires the
critic to dispute the authority of the Constitution and the community
that it defines, and that is a task not lightly engaged. The authority of the
law is bounded, true, but as de Tocqueville recognized more than a cen-
tury ago, in America those bounds are almost without limits. The com-
72mitment to the rule of law is nearly universal.
How widespread is this Fissian, and perhaps Dworkinian, view-
that, given the broad and morally ambitious clauses of our Constitu-
tion, there exists either a strong entailment or a virtual equivalency
between moral and constitutional truth? Were Fiss and Dworkin out-
liers or were they spokespersons, the clearest and most forthright of
our constitutional scholars? Very likely, I think, they were the latter,
although of course it is hard to prove. Dworkin himself, it should be
recalled, rested his extraordinary claim about the connection be-
tween our law and political morality, not on metaphysics, but on the
habits and ways of talking of American lawyers.75 All we need to do,
Dworkin thought, to understand the antipositivist foundations of our
legal-constitutional order is to reflect on our own distinctive patterns
of thought and discourse, minus the confusion brought on by a cen-turyor mre f mig ied .... 74
tury or more of misguided positivistjurisprudence. More generally,
though, although decidedly anecdotally, it just seems to be true-at
least it is often remarked upon, and has been now for two centuries-
that American constitutional lawyers in particular, and maybe Ameri-
can lawyers in general, are indeed inclined to find a happy conver-
gence of their own moral views regarding good governance and their
views about what our Constitution does and does not permit.
72 Id. at 749-50 (citations omitted).
73 DWORKIN, supra note 49, at 14, 28-29, 46.
74 Id. at 290 ("The 'myth' that there is one right answer in a hard case is both recalcitrant
and successful. Its recalcitrance and success count as arguments that it is no myth.").
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Note: This is not the same as holding to a convergence of consti-
tutionalism and personal morality. Obviously, many people believe
that burning the flag is immoral but protected from criminalization
by the First Amendment; that using contraceptives is wrong, but pro-
tected from state interference by constitutional rights; that racist or
anti-Semitic speech is evil, but constitutionally protected as much as
speech we treasure; and so on. The crucial question for Dworkin,
though, is not whether there is a widely shared consensus among
constitutional lawyers on a convergence between constitutional man-
date and personal morality, but whether there is a widely shared con-
sensus among such lawyers on a convergence between constitutional
mandate and political morality with respect to the actions, duties, re-
sponsibilities, and rights of states. I think Dworkin's quasi-empirical
or quasi-sociological claim that there is indeed a widely shared view, if
not consensus, on a convergence between the demands of political
morality and the demands of constitutionalism, as evidenced by our
ways of talking and arguing over the Constitution, might well be
right.
Thus, I suspect most constitutional lawyers generally find that the
Constitution forbids the states from legislating in those areas where
states should not legislate, and permits legislation in those areas
where the state should legislate or where there is no reason they
should not. It is easy, in other words, to find the lawyer who holds to
both the immorality of contraception, flag burning, and racist speech
and their constitutionally-protected status. It is much harder, how-
ever, to find the lawyer who holds that the state should, as a matter of
political morality, forbid flag burning, but that the Constitution does
not permit the state to do so; that the state should criminalize contra-
ception, but that the Constitution clearly forbids it from doing so; or
that the state should not criminalize abortion but that the Constitu-
tion clearly allows it to. For the most part, and again as is often re-
marked, constitutional lawyers tend to find ready at hand constitu-
tional arguments that complement, underscore, and ultimately
bolster their political convictions about the ways that states ought and
ought not to behave. From de Toqueville to Dworkin, observers of
American constitutionalism have found and remarked upon this con-
vergence-Dworkin has not been the first to note it, or its impor-
tance, but he may well have been the first to make it such a central
part of his jurisprudence (rather than an embarrassment) . Whether
he was right to do so is one question, but whether the observation is
sound is another. As to the latter, it seems to me Dworkin has it
right. Constitutional lawyers tend to find a remarkable degree of
75 See generally SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 36, 42-43 (1988) (discussing
Dworkin's view of the convergence of morality and constitutional interpretation).
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convergence between political morality and constitutional mandate-
between what the state ought or ought not to do and what the Consti-
tution requires, allows, or forbids. The Constitution does indeed de-
fine our political morality to such a degree that questions posed in
terms of political morality, such as whether a state ought to do some-
thing, become quite literally incoherent.
B. The Equivalence of Constitutional and Legal Questions
Now let me address much more quickly the second leg of the con-
stitutional-jurisprudence stool: constitutional questions are, for con-
stitutional lawyers and theorists, legal questions, and they are so by vir-
tue of the status of the Constitution as positive, ordinary law. Courts
apply the Constitution as ordinary law, and courts render decisions
about the meaning of the Constitution and its clauses in ways that es-
sentially track legal decision-making in other contexts. Thus, the de-
cision by a court that the Constitution means x, y, or z is made in the
same way, and has roughly the same consequences, precedential and
otherwise, as the decision by a court that a part of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code means a, b, or c. Other government officials may be
bound to uphold the Constitution, and citizens may be deeply inter-
ested and invested in its meaning, but its status as ordinary law gives
the legal profession pride of place in its interpretation. To know
what the Constitution means is to know a part of our law, and to pro-
pound a possible meaning is to engage in a form of legal argument.
The Constitution may or may not expound aspirations, record a his-
tory, suggest the contours of a community, contain contradictions,
mask or legitimate injustice, and so on. What it unquestionably does,
though, according to our dominant constitutional jurisprudence, is
spell out the law. The Constitution is the "supreme Law," of course,
by virtue of its own self-definition.76 What follows for lawyers, I think
distinctively, is that it is therefore ordinary law as well: that the Con-
stitution is the Supreme Law, for most contemporary constitutional
lawyers, can really have no other meaning. Consequently, the ques-
tion posed at the outset-whether or not there exist moral duties on
the part of legislatures to pass laws becomes at heart not just a consti-
tutional question but also by virtue of that fact a legal question:
whether or not there are legal duties, grounded in the Constitution,
but cognizable, if they exist, as law, in courts dedicated to pronounc-
ing it.
76 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution ... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land .... ").
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C. The Equivalence of Legal and Adjudicative Questions
Finally, legal questions, for American constitutional lawyers, are
adjudicative questions in two senses: judges turn to sources of law to
answer them and the answers judges give are themselves law. Law is
that to which judges turn, when answering legal questions, and law is
that which judges produce when they do so. This is not unique to
constitutional lawyers; American lawyers of the last century have been
virtually as one in this belief. Following what is now understood to
have been Chief Justice Marshall's meaning in Marbu 7 7" as ex-
pounded by the twentieth-century Court in Cooper v. Aaron' and then
reinforced by decades of legal realism and postrealist scholarship,7 9
lawyers, including constitutional lawyer-scholars, understand law
categorically as being that which judges decide and that to which
judges look when deciding legal questions. The opinions judges ren-
der are law, and likewise that to which they appeal when writing opin-
ions is law. The question of whether there are moral duties incum-
bent upon legislatures becomes, for lawyers, a question of whether
the Constitution so prescribes. The question of whether the Consti-
tution so prescribes is, then, a distinctively legal question: does the
Constitution legally require anything of legislators? That question
becomes, finally, a question of adjudicative prediction: might a court
ever so hold, and if so how could itjustify that decision?
For the question posed at the outset regarding the duties of legis-
latures, the consequence of all of this is clear enough. For any num-
ber of, by now, very well catalogued reasons-precedential, institu-
tional, jurisprudential, and prudential-courts are not going to
impose, and then enforce, legally binding obligations on legislatures
to pass laws. The answer to the adjudicative question posed above is
straightforward-just look at DeVito and DeShaney. Now, apply tenet
three to this result: because judges will never bind legislatures to act
affirmatively, there is no legally binding obligation to do so. Humpty
Dumpty-style, what judges say is law is law; the law is what the judge
says it is. Judges won't impose duties on legislators; ergo, there are
no legal duties. Now apply tenet two: because there is no legally
binding obligation, there is no constitutional obligation; a constitu-
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the prov-
ince and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
78 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[Tlhe federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law
of the Constitution .... .").
79 The classic texts are Oliver "Wendell Holmes, Address at the Dedication of the New Hall of
the Boston University School of Law: The Path of the law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 110 HARV. L. REV.
991, 991-96 (1997) (the law consists of judicial pronouncements and predictions of judicial




tional obligation without the mandate of law is meaningless. Finally,
tenet one: if there is no constitutional obligation, there is no moral
obligation, at least in any interesting sense. Our Constitution, after
all, perhaps distinctively, defines our political morality. A moral obli-
gation that defines the duties of legislators in a constitutional state yet
lacks a constitutional correlate is close to unthinkable; it is virtually
oxymoronic.
We reach the same result if we reason in the opposite direction.
What happens if we begin with the observation that legislators (like
everyone else) have a moral duty to use their power in morally re-
sponsible ways and follow that up with the more specific political
claim that what that means for legislators (unlike everyone else) is
that they must use their power so as to contribute to the common
good? Now, it is important, at least for my argument, to see that not
much follows regarding the status of this moral obligation, at least di-
rectly, solely from the constitutional lawyer's Dworkinian proclivity to
identify moral truth with the Constitution's meaning. We could, after
all, simply define the Constitution as consisting of whatever might be
our current best understanding of what morality requires. We would
then just have a funny word-constitutionalism-to use as a stand-in
for the more awkward phrase our political morality. Thus, if legislators
are indeed under a moral duty to legislate in some way, then they are
under a constitutional duty, precisely because in Dworkinian fashion
the Constitution codifies moral truth. This would indeed put moral
philosophy at the heart of constitutionalism, in something like the
way Dworkin sometimes seemed to urge. But that alone wouldn't af-
fect much other than labels. It would not, in other words, necessarily
affect our understanding of the content of our political morality. We
would continue to argue about the moral obligations of legislators,
although we would do so by attaching constitutional labels, so to
speak, to the arguments. If (counterfactually) our "constitutional ju-
risprudence" consisted solely of the Dworkinian claim that the Consti-
tution records our political morality, as well as all of our confusions
and doubts about the content of that political morality, there would
be no reason to think that anything in particular would be "lost in
translation" by the impulse to engage in moral argument about our
politics by reference to constitutional phrases, including the moral
duties of legislators. We would argue about whether such duties exist
and we would argue about their content, albeit using constitutional
language when we do so.
But we do not do this. The reason we do not, I think, is that this
purely Dworkinian solution-just rewrite moral truth as constitu-
tional rule and then proceed with the debate accordingly-is ulti-
mately inconsistent with steps two and three of our constitutional ju-
risprudence. The translation of moral claim to constitutional claim is
not the extent of our constitutional jurisprudence. The Constitution,
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according to the first tenet, does define our political morality, but the
Constitution also, according to our second tenet, is law. It is a part of
positive law. Again, the Constitution may be the "bridge" to moral
truth, but it is also the "bridge" to the law that governs. Moral truth,
translated into constitutional rule, must, then, be further translatable
into legal mandate. The constitutional rule that "is" moral truth, in
other words, must also, just as fundamentally, be the constitutional
rule that "is" law.
So, what happens once we identify the constitutional rule that is
moral truth with law? Maybe nothing. Why? Because the word law
can mean many different things-moral law, natural law, positive law,
divine law, eternal law. Again, it is important (at least to my argu-
ment) to note that in a limited, literal sense, nothing much happens
to claims about moral duty, even if they are identified first with con-
stitutionalism and then by virtue of that translation with law: that
duty may well be a "law," one might say, but what is meant by that is
that it is a part of our moral law, or that it is a part of God's law, or a
tenet of natural law, that legislators must use their power responsibly.
Again, there is no reason to think anything terribly vital will be lost in
translation if we identify a moral truth with a constitutional truth and
then the latter with law. Law might, after all, be understood in all
sorts of ways. It might, specifically, be understood as natural law, and
the latter with moral truth. If so, then moral truth (or claim, or duty,
or question) equals constitutional truth, which equals legal truth,
which equals moral truth. We have taken a side trip through consti-
tutional language but wound up where we began. Constitutional law-
yers could discuss the moral duties of legislators as constitutional
questions and therefore as legal questions, yet keep the focus on the
underlying moral nature of both the inquiry and of the duty. The
,language of "law" is no less amenable to a moral interpretation than
is the language of constitutionalism.
But, and here we are at the end of the line of implications, this ac-
commodation of the legal question to the moral is, finally, at odds
with the third, and most explicitly realist prong of constitutional ju-
risprudence. For constitutional lawyers, as with all modern and
postrealist lawyers, law is most decidedly not natural law or moral law
or God's law. Rather, the word law means what courts enforce and that
to which courts look when enforcing it. The moral truth that is constitu-
tional rule and the constitutional rule that is law, must be the "law"
that courts enforce. And what is it that courts do, and will do, regard-
ing legislative duties? Again, courts do not, will not, and possibly
cannot enforce legislative duties to act in certain ways upon legisla-
tors that do not wish to act in those ways. Therefore, those duties,
whatever they are, are not "law." That follows from our third premise
(the Cooper v. Aaron and legal realist tenet). Therefore, they are not a
part of the Constitution. That follows from the second premise (the
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Marbury v. Madison tenet). Therefore, given the identity of moral
truth with constitutionalism, those duties, if they exist, do not do so
by virtue of any moral truth. We get that from the first premise (the
Dworkinian tenet). We reach, finally, the conclusion: for lawyers
steeped in their constitutional jurisprudence, legislators within liberal
constitutional states have no affirmative duties of any sort whatso-
ever-moral, legal, or constitutional-to act. We also have reached,
incidentally, an explanation for what I noted above as an oddity in
Dworkin's description of all of this: why or how it is that laws may be
"good," but nevertheless, unless they are in the very small class of laws
grounded in individual rights, only justified by virtue of the majority's
desire for them. They simply cannot be justified, within the confines
of Dworkin's jurisprudence, by moral truth.
D. Where This Jurisprudence Fails
Now let me just register some critical comments about our ruling
constitutional jurisprudence, again with an eye toward the fate of
moral duties of legislators within it. In my view, each prong of this
constitutional jurisprudence-each of these embedded equivalen-
cies-is dubious, and we would be well advised to give up the juris-
prudential frame they define. Let me begin with Dworkin's heroic
assumption that constitutionalism captures all that is of any interest
regarding moral obligations in a constitutional state. There have, of
course, always been detractors from this view. In an address called
The Path of the Law, Holmes famously worried over a century ago that
our tendency to drench legal concepts in moralism would render the
former less than clear and most decidedly less than liberating.s That
is not my objection; it seems to me that the law is often clearer, not
more obscure, when its moral ambition is explicitly articulated.
Rather, my objection to the moralistic constitution at the heart of
Dworkinian jurisprudence goes to what Holmes did not notice, and
could not have noticed, given his own moral skepticism: that this
Dworkinian drenching of law-any law, but particularly constitutional
law-with moralism can likewise limit our moral sense, obfuscate our
moral intuition, and dangerously dull our capacity for moral criti-
cism."' I have argued elsewhere that the habitual identification of the
moral with the constitutional is a bad habit we ought to give up for
any number of related reasons: it rests on an overly generous reading
of the Constitution, on an exceptionalist if not chauvinistic view of
80 Holmes, supra note 79, at 991-92.
81 It looks like a version of what moral philosophers once called the "naturalistic fal-
lacy"-the assumption that what is, by its existence, ought to be. See, e.g., GEORGE EDWARD
MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA passim (Cambridge Univ. Press 1971) (1903).
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American history, and on an excessively identitarian understanding
of American citizenship-an understanding that carries huge costs.,"
All I want to suggest here is that it also clouds moral thought-as
English critics of American constitutionalism, such as Jeremy Ben-
tham"s and then later H.L.A. Hart,14 have long argued. The Brits are
right on this.
It is a simple enough point. We should all-American constitu-
tional theorists as well as American citizens-at least be capable of
thinking about, for example, whether the state should criminalize
abortion, guns, or hate speech; whether the state should execute
people; whether the state should guarantee welfare, or jobs, or clean
air and water; or whether citizens of rural states should have a greater
voice in governance than citizens of urban-dominated states. And it
might behoove us to think about these questions as moral questions,
independent of constitutional mandate, for the simple reason that, at
root, that is what they are. It surely follows that, as to the constitu-
tional correlates of these questions-does the Fourteenth Amend-
ment forbid the states from criminalizing guns, hate speech, or abor-
tion? is the death penalty cruel and unusual punishment? does the
Constitution contain unenumerated positive welfare rights? are bi-
cameralism and the electoral college constitutional anomalies given
"one person, one vote?" and so on-the Constitution's answers might
be, from a moral point of view, wrong-possibly badly, maybe even
disastrously. We ought to at least be cognizant of that possibility. Not
just washing, but drenching our moral sense, intuition, reasoning,
and capacity for moral argument in the increasingly cynical acid of
what passes for constitutional "thought" has done little but obscure
the quite real possibility-again the substantial possibility-of serious
moral error, not only in constitutional law, but in the Constitution it-
self. And surely, a part of what the Constitution might be faulted for
is its understatement with respect to the affirmative moral duties of
legislatures.
If this is right, then it might behoove us to attend to the negative
implication of Holmes' The Path of the Law argument. Maybe Holmes
was right when he insisted we should think about the law's mandates
82 Robin West, Constitutional Culture or Ordinary Politics: A Reply to Reva Siegel, 94 CAL. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 22-33, on file with the University of Pennsylvania
Journal of Constitutional Law) (arguing that Reva Siegel's invitation to constitutionalize moral
beliefs is problematic).
83 See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES: A CRITICISM OF
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE'S Commentaries on the Laws of England 53-56 (Charles Warren Everett
ed., Clarendon Press 1976) (1928) (contrasting law with morality).
84 H.L.A. HART, American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble
Dream (1977), reprinted in ESSAYS INJURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 123 (1983) (comment-
ing on Dworkin and Nozick); H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES INJURISPRUDENCE
AND POLITICAL THEORY 147-61 (1982) (critiquing Dworkin's interpretation of morality).
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from the perspective of the "bad man." 5 But it might also be true (in
fact it might even follow from that Holmesian claim) that we should
think about the distinctively moral questions regarding what lawmak-
ers ought to do, including those moral questions with constitutional
overtones, from the perspective of the moral man or woman who leg-
islates, rather than so relentlessly from the perspective of the bad
man who seeks to minimize law's impact. There are likely strong
moral arguments to the effect that legislators are under moral im-
peratives to use their power for good, and those strong arguments
might be good arguments regardless of whether the Constitution so
requires. Particularly, from where we now stand historically, in
Katrina's wake, it has become quite clear to at least large swaths of the
viewing public that local, state, and federal governmental officials can
on occasion be in profound breach of their duty to provide "protec-
tion of the laws" against just such a calamity. Governmental nonfea-
sance can be as lethal as governmental misfeasance. If our co-citizens
are right to be so outraged, then perhaps there is indeed such a duty,
and maybe there was such a breach. If so, and if that matters, then
constitutional lawyers and scholars surely ought not wall themselves
off from the ensuing dialogue regarding the nature of that duty and
its breach by virtue of a misguided faith in the necessary moral cor-
rectness of our positive Constitution. In short, even if the historical,
political, legal, popular, aspirational, and textual Constitutions all fail
to so prescribe, there may nevertheless be moral duties on the part of
lawmakers to protect citizens against calamity. Just as important, if
the Constitution does not so prescribe, then perhaps the Constitu-
tion, and not our moral common sense, ought to be faulted.
The second equivalency-from constitutional question to legal
question-is likewise dubious and a habit of thought we could well do
without. That the Constitution declares itself to be the Supreme Law
hardly settles the question whether or not we are right to think of the
Constitution as ordinary law: the Framers were natural lawyers, fully
comfortable, as we are not, with multiple meanings of the word Law,
(particularly when capitalized) as meaning not only positive law, but
also natural law, or moral law, or God's law, or divine law, or eternal
law. That the Constitution is the supreme law does not in any obvi-
ous way suggest that it is therefore "ordinary law" to be construed in
ordinary ways by courts. What it might mean for the Constitution to
be Law, but not law, is simply a neglected question of twentieth-
century jurisprudence.
Popular constitutionalists have begun to suggest some alternatives,
but the jurisprudence of these claims is woefully underdeveloped.
8 Holmes, supra note 79, at 993.
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The Constitution might be, according to some of our popular consti-
tutionalists, a mix of political, moral, and legal directives; 6 according
to others, the political content of the Constitution might best be re-
ferred to as the "thin" popular one rather than the thick adjudicated
one.8 7 The political, historical, and aspirational Constitution, as op-
posed to the strictly legal Constitution, according to virtually all of
the popular Constitutionalists, needs development; we need to un-
derstand the meaning, operation, and ways of interpreting the Con-
stitution as it is understood and deployed by nonjudicial state actors,
as well as by citizens in popular political movements. All of this, I
think, is right, and promising88- have said plenty of it myself. But
what has gone unnoticed to date, I believe, is the deep incompatibil-
ity of popular constitutionalism with the dominant jurisprudential as-
sumptions of our time, within which these views are being developed.
We do not exhibit, in our jurisprudential or constitutional conversa-
tions, a great deal of suppleness regarding meanings of the word law.
To understand the Constitution as Law, but not law, as a part of that
which governs us, but not exhaustively a part of that which courts en-
force, will require a shift in our jurisprudential framework, not just a
shift in our understanding of our constitutional history. It will re-
quire, in short, the development of a nonpositivist, but nevertheless
secular, jurisprudence and a nonpositivism that is in turn freed of
dependence upon, and association with, judicial elaboration of foun-
dational law.
Finally, the equivalency of even our positive "law" with adjudica-
tive law-the assumption that positive (not natural) law is that which
courts decide, and that which courts turn to when deciding law, as
well as the corollary that constitutional law is whatever the courts de-
cide it to be-is a residual habit of realist thought we might be well
advised to drop, particularly, albeit not only, within the realm of con-
stitutional law. First, it is neither warranted nor required by Mar-
shall's dictum in Marbury. Marshall did of course declare it to be the
Court's province to determine the content and meaning of law, but it
is possible, and indeed likely, that what he meant by that was not that
the Court's role in our constitutional form of government is to be the
exclusive arbiter of the Constitution, but that the Court, and courts,
must decide the content of ordinary law, and that in order to do so,
the Court must decide the meaning of the Constitution to ascertain
86 KRAMER, supra note 47, at 9-34.
87 TUSHNET, supra note 31 passim.
88 For one convincing example of an attempt to do something like this, see Siegel, supra
note 47.
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whether or not the ordinary law is in conflict with it.89 The Court
must determine the content of ordinary law-it must state "what the
law is"-and to do so it must consult the Constitution; if an ordinary
law under question is inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
is not a law. Likewise, the legislature must decide what the law ought
to be, and will be, and to do so, it must likewise consult the Constitu-
tion. Cooper v. Aaron notwithstanding, this is a straightforward and
untortured understanding of the meaning of Marshall's utterance as
well as of the Constitution's language. This straightforward under-
standing of Marbury's dicta, as well as its implications, has become
completely lost to us by virtue not so much of the Aaron case itself-
no one case could accomplish such a result-but rather, I believe, by
virtue of the fifty years of realist jurisprudence on which Aaron built
and within which it seemed so natural.
That equivalence-of positive law with adjudicated decision-is
required by neither logic nor history. We might understand positive
law, particularly the positive law of the Constitution, as directed not at
courts but at legislatures, as interpreted not by judges but by elected
representatives, and as enforced not through judicial decree but
through democratic processes. Such a positive, legal, but nonadjudi-
cative Constitution is not the same thing as a "populist" one; it
makes more sense, I think, to think of it as a legislated Constitution,
regulating legislation, not popular protest, and of interest (primarily)
to legislators, not activists. The legislated Constitution, so defined,
need neither supplant nor be superior to either the adjudicated or
the popular Constitution. It is fully compatible with both a popular,
political, and aspirational Constitution and an adjudicated Constitu-
tion, along with a rigorous and even aggressive system of judicial re-
view that enforces it. It is ruled out of bounds neither by precedent
nor language; indeed the language of Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment seemingly requires the existence of a legislated Consti-
tution, interpreted as well as enforced by Congress.9' Rather, it has
been ruled out of bounds by virtue of jurisprudential habits-a ha-
bitual rather than thoughtful identification of the very idea of posi-
tive law with the content of judicial opinion and with legal argument
with the processes of appellate decision making.
89 See KRAMER, supra note 47, at 115-16, 127; Sylvia Snowiss, TheMarbury of 1803 and the Mod-
ern Marbury, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 231, 234-35 (2003); Jeremy Waldron, Judicial Power and
Popular Sovereignty, in MARBURY VERSUS MADISON. DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 181 (Mark A.
Graber & Michael Perhac eds., 2002).
90 Cf TUSHNET, supra note 31, at 13 (advocating "populist constitutional law" (emphasis
omitted)).
91 Cf U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by ap-
propriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
Oct. 2006]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Once we drop these three jurisprudential assumptions-none of
which is a part of liberalism, and none of which is required by consti-
tutionalism-the question of legislative duties comes into sharp relief,
as does its importance for constitutional theorists. If we drop the as-
sumption that the Constitution exhausts our moral knowledge re-
garding governance, then we can see clearly that there may be moral
duties incumbent upon legislators to act in certain ways, regardless of
the Constitution's mandates. If the Constitution and constitutional-
ism, as seems at least possible, if not likely, support the existence of
such duties (albeit not as legal obligations), then there is a happy
convergence of constitutionalism (albeit not constitutional law) and
political morality. If I am wrong on that, and both the Constitution
and constitutionalism squarely cut the other way-if the idea of con-
stitutionalism in this country really is nothing but a caution against
governmental excess rather than a guide for governmental action-
then we need to skeptically evaluate the Constitution's worthiness in
light of sound liberal principles to the contrary. If the Constitution is
utterly silent on it, we need to pursue the question of legislative obli-
gations in its own right, unsullied, so to speak, by constitutional sen-
sibilities. But whichever way we go on any of that, it is clearly a ques-
tion that matters, and that should matter to Constitutionalists: how
do we, how have we, and how should we constitute our political obli-
gations? If the Constitution structures the way we think about gov-
ernment, it ought to structure the way we think about what govern-
ment should do, as well as what it must not. If it does not, then it is
an illiberal document that might not be worth the outsized reverence
we have granted it.
Likewise, if we drop the identification of the Constitution with
positive law, and grant that the Constitution might indeed be "law,"
but in a nonpositivist sense, then again the question of legislative
duty, within not just liberal constitutionalism but also our Constitu-
tion, comes squarely into view. Both the original and the recon-
structed Constitutions were meant to strengthen, not weaken, gov-
ernment, and the Reconstruction-era Constitution in particular
seemingly addressed governmental nonfeasance, not malfeasance, as
that which stood in need of correction. Whether or not constitution-
ally required obligations or constitutionally inspired moral obliga-
tions are legally enforceable ought to be recognized as a separate
question from whether or not they exist. A Constitution can do many
things, as the world's now diverse constitutional cultures testify; there
is nothing illogical or counterfactual about a Constitution that creates
both legally binding rights and obligations and politically cognizable
but not legally binding moral duties.
Third, if we drop the identification of positive law with adjudica-
tive law, we can address the possibility that the Constitution, and the
Fouteenth Amendment in particular, imposes real, legal, positive (in
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both senses) obligations on states to provide protection of laws, as
well as due process, and upon Congress to take some affirmative ac-
tion likewise in the event that the states do not, and that these legal
obligations exist even without judicial recognition. This may be un-
familiar terrain, but it is not, or should not be, oxymoronic. Let us
say that for something to be law it has to be in some sense binding.
Does that mean that for it to be law it has to be the sort of thing
courts enforce? No. Legal obligations can be binding to the degree
they are viewed as binding (looks like a duck, walks like a duck, has
the footprint of a duck), and whether or not something is binding
can be a matter of culture, self-understanding, job description, or po-
litical consequence as much as of penal sanction. A Congress or state
legislature cognizant of their binding legal obligations to provide
protection of the laws just might be more inclined to view it as their
moral and political duty to do so. Whatever else might be said for or
against it, the century of sometimes-aggressive, sometimes-not-so-
aggressive judicial enforcement of constitutional rights has by no
means disproven James Bradley Thayer's worry of a century ago.92
Judicial oversight of laws made by the representative branches in the
name of the Constitution might indeed inadvertently weaken the felt
sense of fidelity to that document by those branches as well as by the
citizens that elect them.
What Thayer did not foresee is that, in a time such as our own in
which our political morality has become so thoroughly identified with
constitutionalism, and constitutionalism in turn with the Court's
pronouncements, the legislator's sense of political morality, and
therefore of his own moral duty, no less than his sense of constitu-
tional fidelity, can thereby become weakened as well. If the Constitu-
tion, as read by the Court, imposes no obligations upon our lawmak-
ers, and our political and moral expectations are aligned with
authoritative judicial understandings of the Constitution, then our
sense of the political and moral obligations of state actors will be cut
down to size as well. When that happens, a nation, no less than a city,
might find itself buffeted by uncontrollable and profoundly destruc-
tive currents. To stop the resulting flood, however, I think we are go-
ing to have to do both more and less than "tak[e] the Constitution
away from the Courts, 93 or return the Constitution to "We the Peo-
ple."94 We need to break the jurisprudential habits of mind that put,
not just the Constitution, but our political morality, our aspirational
92 James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV.
L. REv. 129 (1893) (indicating as problematic the breadth of scope of courts' judicial review
power).
93 TUSHNET, supra note 31.
94 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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or political Constitution, and our understanding of legalism itself in
the hands of judges. There was, and is, no basis for the investment.
What is morally required of our representatives, and ourselves, when
we exercise political power over one another is by no means necessar-
ily coextensive with what is constitutionally required. What is consti-
tutionally required, on the other hand, is by no means necessarily co-
extensive with the commands of any sovereign or the mandates of a
Rule of Recognition; the Constitution is more than that. And lastly,
there is no reason to think that even what is legally required by the
Constitution as a matter of positive law is limited to that which courts
can enforce.
Reclaiming the scope of our political morality, as well as both the
nonpositivistic and nonadjudicated Constitution as fit subjects for
constitutional investigations outside of courts, would, minimally,
bring our constitutional conversations in line with the growing sense
of public opinion that governmental nonfeasance, and not malfea-
sance, is at least a great, and perhaps the great, problem of govern-
ance in a post-Katrina world. My greatest hope is that this change in
jurisprudential thinking might, maximally, bring constitutional
thought to bear on the possibility that, in an age of corporatism, lib-
erals and constitutionalists both should begin to explore the possibil-
ity that the domestic, democratic state might best be viewed as a po-
tential "intermediary" agent of liberal change, capable of disrupting
the domination of one form of power-corporate-over ordinary
people's lives. The state obviously cannot do so, or be such, without a
sense of its constitutive duties flowing to people, and peoples, rather
than to corporate life. In other words, the state cannot be faulted for
not doing so by a community of critics deaf to the possibility that it
ought to do so. My point here though is just this: recognizing, and
ultimately upending, our constitutional jurisprudence would at least
bring into view, as a question worthy for constitutional dialogue, the
extent of positive legislative duties. We need to think about the pos-
sibility that those duties actually conflict with constitutionally pro-
tected rights; we might want to reshape those constitutional rights ac-
cordingly. We need to think about the possibility that those duties
are consistent with constitutional politics, albeit not required by con-
stitutional law; if so, we should bring the mandates of the political
Constitution into sharp relief. Lastly, we need to think about the pos-
sibility that those duties are indeed required by our positive constitu-
tional law, albeit not that part of our law that is routinely enforced
through adjudicative processes. Rethinking the meaning and history
of constitutionalism might be a necessary prerequisite to a sensible
consideration of any of those possibilities. I believe it is. But it is
clearly not sufficient. Rethinking the jurisprudence that for so long
has made this possible misreading of our own history feel so natural is
just as vital. The reconstruction of American jurisprudence that is in
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turn necessary to make that happen, unlike the reconstruction of
American constitutional history, has not yet even begun.
